So many have opined on the reasons why the Penelas Penny Tax Plan was defeated. As the leader of the opposition, I offer my two cents worth why the Metrorail Sales Tax lost by a landslide 68 percent to 32 percent margin and an incredible 547 precincts to 67 precincts difference in the vote.

On June 22, 1999, at a regular meeting of the Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners ("BCC"), I spoke against putting the Metrorail Sales Tax proposal on the ballot. I preceded my blistering remarks to the BCC by throwing down the gauntlet and advising that I would do all in my power to defeat the ballot proposal. I was only one of a handful of speakers opposing the proposition, while dozens of other speakers voiced their support in a carefully orchestrated show of support for Mayor Alex Penelas’ tax increase plan.

After the BCC voted 9-3 to adopt Ordinance 99-68 ("Ordinance"), subject to voter approval at a referendum, I walked a few steps to Mayor Penelas who was standing at the podium, shook hands with him, and said: "May the best argument win." The best argument did win as shown by the overwhelming public rejection on July 29.

The first problem with the proposed ordinance was the lack of integrity as to how and when it was proposed. On Mar. 29, Mayor Penelas wrote the Metro Commission that he was opposed to simply throwing money at the transportation problem and he was opposed to a sales tax referendum. In May, Mayor Penelas flip-flopped on his sales tax position, comparable to his change of position on the American Airlines Arena nearing completion on the shore of Biscayne Bay with a shortage of 8,000 parking spaces and poor fan access, to the detriment of the Miami Arena and Overtown, and with a $300 million taxpayer subsidy.

What the opponents revealed was that the only real transportation plan was the five-year, $4.2 billion Transportation Improvement Plan and the skeletal $7.2 billion 2020 Long Term Transportation Plan and not the Penelas hodge-podge, cellophane tape plan. No studies pertaining to the necessity for or benefits from doubling the bus fleet and costs relating thereto were made or offered in support of his proposal. Nor were studies made or offered in support of a Metrorail expansion. Public hearings as to both were nonexistent.

Metrorail is a proven failure which uses general revenue funds to pay for operating losses.

During the past 15 years of its existence, Metrorail has drained away over $500 million from essential county services. More Metrorail would be even more ruinous to the county’s coffers filled with property taxes. Neither Mayor Penelas nor his supporters could explain away the costly failure that Metrorail represents.

Paying a higher sales tax to buy a newspaper, a car, clothing, restaurant food, household products or on telephone, electricity and rent, made reasonable people concerned for their wallets versus the speculative benefits to be achieved if there were a tax increase of $9.3 billion just over the next 20 years. While the Mayor’s "bait and switch" game benefited a few, most saw through that transparent hypocritical use of tax moneys to buy votes.

I filed a lawsuit on behalf of a plaintiff to seek a ruling from the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court that the false and misleading ballot language was unclear and ambiguous and, therefore, legally insufficient. Instead, the Court ruled that the ballot language was legally sufficient, but noted it could have been drafted better and that the issue was about a funding plan, not a transportation plan. Despite the court’s ruling, the public came to realize that the ballot language was false and misleading and disregarded its rhetoric. The most obvious falsehood in the ballot was the statement that "all tolls" would be abolished, when only 4 of 22 would be eliminated and five more would be added within five years.

As to tolls, the public was perturbed at the 25 cent increase on July 12, but once people were educated to paying 50 cents and 20 percent of the cars used other roads, traffic ran smoothly. However, the public saw the timing of the increase as the Mayor’s gambit to get votes by upsetting drivers and that backfired on him.

The Mayor’s proposal to buy votes by reducing or eliminating bus fares was poor public policy and one that could not sustain itself indefinitely because such plan would increase the bus operating deficit by at least $10 million annually. Moreover, many, if not most, bus riders understood they would pay more in sales tax than they would save in reduced bus fares.

The public resented that $2 million was being spent to buy the election, most of it contributed by out of state sources and tax exempt entities. The "no" vote was a victory for the people and democracy because it showed that a slick, big budget Madison Avenue campaign could not buy the election.

I authored a flyer which I disseminated individually and by an extensive network of volunteers who paid to make copies out of their own pockets. I believe the flyer made a huge impact on the voters because of its visibility and the on the street distribution efforts made by numerous concerned citizen volunteers.

Objective printed information in the newspapers, and on television and radio debates, focused the public’s mind on the issue and let them weigh the views of both sides. The best argument won the vote.

The public was confident that the sky would not fall on the county because of denying a distrusted Metro government with a multibillion dollar slush fund. The "no" vote was an expression of optimism that transportation problems will be solved without just throwing money at them. Soon many of such solutions will come to pass.

Perhaps more than any other single factor causing the overwhelming landslide "no" vote was the passion for the issue and against the 15.4 percent Metrorail Sales Tax increase. I and my supporters helped to engender that passion in the public to cause an astounding 28 percent of registered voters to go to the polls in 100 degree heat to vote "no." A 28 percent turnout under the circumstances was remarkable and shows the public will respond when the subject of the election matters to them.

There is little question that the "no" vote was a personal defeat for Mayor Penelas. He was the chief salesman for a "yes" vote and his transportation proposal, and he put his personal electoral popularity on the line to win the vote. The effect on the Mayor’s future political ambitions can only be assessed the next time he runs for public office, but certainly the July 29, 1999, 68 percent "no" to 32 percent "yes" vote hurt him.